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Abstract 
By assuming that the individual derives utility from consumption only, the resulting optimal decision to save in 
the Ramsey model depends on the rate of return, given a certain time preference. If therefore the production 
function is such that this rate of return remains relatively low, the individual reacts unconsciously by refusing to 
save despite the capital depreciates and the household grows. We argue that it is conceptually necessary in that 
framework to assume a direct preference for saving (or for thriftiness) in the utility function, not only to make 
the individual behave as a real human being who cares about the survival of the household, but also to account 
reasonably for any other motives to save or accumulate than the rate of return. We show it generalizes the model 
in a way to recover static properties of the exogenous Solow version and to extend results of capitalist spirit 
models following Zou (1994). 
Keywords: bequest, status, thriftiness, capitalist spirit, ramsey model 
1. Introduction 
It goes to our mind almost systematically, that the flow of saving should never be included in the Utility function 
along with consumption, to solve the inter-temporal maximization problem of the consumer. Two reasons can be 
stated precisely and may sound a bit obvious only at first glance. The first one which is to consider savings as 
having no intrinsic value for the individual, can arguably be contested in some cases. The second, a technical 
redundancy applying to the basic model where the goal of the individual is to reallocate exogenous flows of 
income, can be shown to not apply to models of accumulation. The goal of this paper is to criticize the 
systematic neutrality of a Utility effect of savings in the literature, and to report the relevant implications in the 
Ramsey growth model where specifically, such neutrality may actually be inappropriate. 
To contest the first reason for excluding savings from Utility in the Ramsey context, it might not be necessary to 
recall the literature motivating that individuals derive direct Utility from wealth for the status; see Zou (1994), 
Bakshi and Chen (1996), Carroll (2000) or Kumhof, Rancière and Winant (2015). Indeed, by introducing the 
saving flow in the Utility function, not only is the continual seek for a higher capital and status captured, but also 
a direct preference for thriftiness which should be involved if the individual worries about the necessity to 
renovate the depreciated capital, or to accumulate sufficient wealth for the growing household. (Note 1). 
In life-cycle (LC) or overlapping generations (OLG) models, the neutrality of this direct preference for 
thriftiness or wealth accumulation is systematically constrained each period, such that the individual saves only 
if the interest rate is attractive. Because of this particularity, alternative models accounting for the bequest motive 
have been proposed in the literature. One type includes for example Barro (1974) or Laitner (1992), where 
successive generations working for only one period value the level of Utility of their children. Another consists 
in “joy of giving models” like for example Andreoni (1990), or more recently Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes (2002), 
where individuals gain satisfaction from bequeathing a part their lifetime income to the children. Although the 
second type has been extensively examined in the literature, the altruistic Ramsey model has never been 
explored under the assumption of a direct preference for bequeathing savings that are reinvested. It could be 
supposed indeed, that each generation working at period t leaves a bequest that serves to renovate or increase the 
capital left to the children at t+1, before retiring or eventually dying. From this conceptual viewpoint, a direct 
preference for saving finds a very strong motivation in that framework, aside from a plausible preference for 
thriftiness or wealth accumulation. 
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Technically, it may have seemed redundant at first glance to introduce explicitly this preference in the model, 
because the dynamics is already such that savings and accumulation occur up to a steady-state. However, this 
result is precisely due to the properties of the production function and not to a particular intention of the 
individual to accumulate or renovate capital. It is well known for example that under the case of a small open 
economy facing a relatively low world interest rate, the dynamics conterfactually predicts that this economy 
never saves and for instance, that it asymptotically mortgages all of its capital and labor income; see Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1995, chapter 3) or Hof and Wirl (2008). Similar unplausible results occur in the case of a closed 
economy with for example an Ak production function. Starting indeed from a steady-state position, if a 
permanent productivity shock occurs such that A decreases to A’, individuals chose to remain on a relatively high 
level of consumption and to neglect the capital depreciation until it totally disappears. We show (in appendix) 
that including a direct preference for saving or for thriftiness in the utility function is a way to make the 
representative agent conscious as a real human being and to reach a new viable solution. 
Another technical detail that defends the necessity to introduce a direct preference for saving in the Ramsey 
model is that, contrary to basic inter-temporal models where the goal of the individual is to reallocate exogenous 
flows of income, this one endogenizes the behavior of a ‘saver’ (the Solow agent); i.e. it studies the long-run 
accumulation process of capital that results from optimal demands for consumption and savings at each period. 
As a direct consequence, the microeconomic theorem of integrability applies, which means the corresponding 
Utility function is of the type U(Ct,St). (Note 2)  
Assuming a direct preference for saving or accumulating generates a more general dynamics than the standard 
one and even those of models accounting for the capitalist spirit as Zou (1994). Furthermore, it allows to recover 
the basic static properties of the exogenous Solow version. 
Similarly to growth models involving absolute wealth in Utility as Zou (1994), or relative wealth as Corneo and 
Jeanne (2001), the presented model allows to invest more than in the standard version by modulating the 
preference for wealth accumulation. This property is known as a plausible way to contrast with the contested 
lower boundary condition and convergence theorem of the traditional theory. It implies for instance that 
necessary and sufficient conditions required to meet the golden rule of accumulation can be specified. Another 
similarity that might also be important to report, is that the effect of the natural growth rate of workers on the 
steady-state level of capital per capita appears confirmed. Those common results could eventually be interpreted 
as two steps already made towards a reconciliation with Solow’s static properties of the steady-state.  
In contrast with this previous literature however, the proposed preference function generates a slower transition, 
and offers the possibility to reach also lower steady-state levels of capital per capita than in the standard model 
by investing less. Aside from allowing to recover a total coherence with the basic exogenous version, this second 
property might complement explanations of cross-country differences, and for instance, reconcile more empirical 
growth facts of developing countries with optimal growth theory. 
The remainder is organized as follows. Section 2 shows that applying this type of preferences in the Ramsey 
model appears to generate more consistent results than in the standard case. Section 3 concentrates on a 
discussion of the transition through a comparative analysis, and Section 4 concludes. 
2. A Further Formulation of the Ramsey Growth Model 
The first section presents the model which involves an interesting application of the Pontryagin’s Maximum 
Principle. The second discusses the steady-state and Golden Rule. 
2.1 The Optimal Control Program 
At time t, a representative generation composed of L workers cares about consuming and reinvesting a part of 
income produced. The instantaneous preference function is defined by 𝑈𝑡(𝑐𝑡, 𝑠𝑡), where 𝑐𝑡 denotes per capita 
consumption at t, 𝑠𝑡 denotes per capita savings (or bequests), and 𝜃 ∈ (0,1) is a proportion which measures the 
degree of preference for consumption over savings. The budget constraint of this representative agent is given by 
𝑐𝑡 + 𝑠𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡, where 𝑦𝑡 denotes income per worker. The production function is supposed of the Cobb-Douglas 
form with constant returns to scale, such that 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑘𝑡) = 𝑘𝑡
𝛼 , where 𝑘𝑡  denotes capital per worker, and 
𝛼 ∈ (0,1). The dynastic Utility function (after substitution of 𝑠𝑡) is denoted by 𝑉{𝑐𝑡, 𝑘𝑡}. It is maximized over an 
infinite horizon subject to a dynamic constraint of capital accumulation (by the social planner):  
Max𝑐𝑡  𝑉{𝑐𝑡 , 𝑘𝑡} = ∫ 𝑈𝑡(𝑐𝑡 , 𝑘𝑡) 𝑒
(𝑛−𝛽)𝑡𝑑𝑡
∞
𝑡0
                        (1) 
        s.t.     ?̇?𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑘𝑡) − 𝑐𝑡 − (𝑛 + 𝛿)𝑘𝑡                              (2) 
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where 𝑛 is the natural growth rate of workers, 𝛽 is the usual degree of impatience and 𝛿 is the rate of 
depreciation of capital. We impose the usual restriction 𝛽 > 𝑛 to ensure a feasible interior solution to the 
problem.  
For the sake of concreteness, we assume a Cobb-Douglas Utility function 𝑈𝑡(𝑐𝑡, 𝑠𝑡) = 𝑐𝑡
𝜃𝑠𝑡
1−𝜃  and its 
log-transformation 𝑈𝑡(𝑐𝑡, 𝑠𝑡) = 𝜃ln(𝑐𝑡) + (1 − 𝜃)ln(𝑠𝑡).  
Considering the first specification for example, the Hamiltonian is given by: 
𝐻𝑡(𝑐𝑡 , 𝑠𝑡) = 𝑐𝑡
𝜃[𝑓(𝑘𝑡) − 𝑐𝑡]
1−𝜃𝑒(𝑛−𝛽)𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡𝑒
(𝑛−𝛽)𝑡[𝑓(𝑘𝑡) − 𝑐𝑡 − (𝑛 + 𝛿)𝑘𝑡]         (3) 
After standard computations (exposed in appendix), the resulting differential equation of consumption is: 
 ?̇?𝑡 =
1−𝑎𝜃
1−𝜃
[(2 − 𝑎𝜃 − 𝜃)𝑓𝑘 − (1 − 𝑎)(𝛿 + 𝛽)]𝑐𝑡 − 𝑎𝜃(𝑛 + 𝛿)𝑓𝑘𝑘𝑡              (4) 
In clear, there can be multiple dynamical systems depending on the value of 𝑎 ∈ (0,1), which satisfy the first 
necessary conditions. This means that among all admissible values of 𝑎, or 𝜆𝑡 as explained by Schättler and 
Ledzewicz (2012), it remains to determine which one(s) maximize(s) 𝑉𝑡{𝑐𝑡
∗, 𝑘𝑡
∗}. In that sense, we may now 
define 𝑎 as being a choice variable associated to a set of controlled trajectories, and 𝑎∗ as being the rational 
choice associated to the optimal one which maximizes total welfare; i.e., the value of 𝑎 is endogenously set by 
the maximizing behavior. 
Contrary to the differential equation of consumption (4), the one of the log-transformed Utility can admit the 
value of 𝜃 = 1, in which case it simplifies to the standard Ramsey equation. Its expression is given by: 
 
𝑐?̇?
𝑐𝑡
=
1−𝑎𝜃
1+𝑎𝜃(𝑎−2)
[2𝑎(1 − 𝜃)𝑓𝑘 + (1 − 𝑎)(𝑓𝑘 − 𝛽 − 𝛿)] −
𝑎(1−𝜃)
1+𝑎𝜃(𝑎−2)
(𝑛 + 𝛿)𝛼           (5) 
The graphical resolution of the dynamical systems shows that for any 𝑎 ∈ (0,1), there exists a unique saddle 
path in each case leading to a steady state equilibrium denoted by {𝑐𝑇
∗ (𝑎), 𝑘𝑇
∗ (𝑎)} . The phase diagram 
corresponding to the multiplicative Cobb Douglas case (Figure 1), shows that the parameter 𝑎 affects only the 
convexity of the ‘𝑐?̇? = 0 locus’. (Note 3) The level of consumption increases to the left of this locus, and 
decreases to the right. For the case of the log-Utility (Figure 2), the phase diagram is identical to the standard one 
except that the vertical ‘𝑐?̇? = 0 locus’ depends now on the parameter 𝑎. 
 
Figure 1. Phase diagram for the multiplicative Cobb-Douglas case 
 
        
Figure 2. Phase diagram for the additive Cobb-Douglas case 
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Let {𝑐𝑡
∗(𝑎), 𝑘𝑡
∗(𝑎)} denote any equilibrium (or saddle path) solution that leads to the steady-state at 𝑡 = 𝑇. It can 
easily be noticed that the transversality condition lim𝑡→∞ 𝜆𝑡(𝑎)𝑘𝑡
∗(𝑎)𝑒(𝑛−𝛽)𝑡 = 0, is fulfilled at equilibrium if 
𝛽 > 𝑛 because: 
lim𝑡→∞ 𝜆𝑡(𝑎) = 𝑈𝑐𝑇∗ (𝑎), from the first necessary condition, 
lim𝑡→∞ 𝑘𝑡
∗(𝑎)𝑒(𝑛−𝛽)𝑡 = 𝑘𝑇
∗ (𝑎). lim
𝑡→∞
𝑒(𝑛−𝛽)𝑡 = 0, if 𝛽 > 𝑛 
Let the control set be defined by: 
𝑍 = {𝑐𝑡
∗(𝑎) ∈ ℝ++ / 𝑐𝑡
∗(𝑎) <  𝑦𝑡
∗(𝑎) ∀ 𝑎 ∈ (0,1)}, 
such that total welfare 𝑉𝑡{𝑐𝑡
∗(𝑎), 𝑘𝑡
∗(𝑎)} is restricted to the set of real numbers. We can now proceed to a formal 
definition of a feasible optimal solution to the problem. 
PROPOSITION 1: An admissible controlled trajectory {𝑐𝑡
∗(𝑎∗), 𝑘𝑡
∗(𝑎∗)} satisfying the necessary Pontryagin’s 
conditions ∀ 𝑎∗ ∈ (0,1) , 𝑐𝑡
∗(𝑎∗) ∈ 𝑍  and 𝑘𝑡
∗(𝑎∗) ∈ ℝ++ , is an optimal controlled trajectory if and only if 
𝑉𝑡{𝑐𝑡
∗(𝑎), 𝑘𝑡
∗(𝑎)} ≤ 𝑉𝑡{𝑐𝑡
∗(𝑎∗), 𝑘𝑡
∗(𝑎∗)} ∀ 𝑎 ∈ (0,1) / 𝑎 ≠ 𝑎∗, 𝑐𝑡
∗(𝑎) ∈ 𝑍, 𝑘𝑡
∗(𝑎) ∈ ℝ++. 
An important result to keep in mind, is that the rational choice of the optimal trajectory is determinant for the 
terminal steady-state {𝑐𝑇
∗ (𝑎∗), 𝑘𝑇
∗ (𝑎∗)} reached in the long run. 
2.2 Steady-States and Golden Rule 
Contrary to the multiplicative Cobb Douglas Utility function, the log form allows to derive a steady-state 
solution analytically, which is: 
𝑘𝑇
∗ (𝑎) = [
(1−𝑎𝜃)(1−2𝑎𝜃+𝑎)𝛼
𝑎(1−𝜃)(𝑛+𝛿)𝛼+(1−𝑎𝜃)(1−𝑎)(𝛽+𝛿)
]
1
(1−𝛼)
                          (6) 
For any non-corner point (𝜃, 𝑎) ∈ (0,1) × (0,1), the steady-state level of capital (or income) per worker is a 
decreasing function of the natural growth rate. Hence, as soon as individuals are assumed to gain some Utility 
from accumulating or saving, the negative impact of population growth known from the basic exogenous Solow 
model is recovered. 
Another important static property that plays a crucial role for the dynamics is the one of the golden rule from 
Phelps (1961). The Ramsey growth model, as it is used in most macroeconomic studies, is characterized by a 
steady-state level of capital per worker that remains always lower than the consumption maximizing level (and 
hence, than the over-accumulation one as well). As explained previously, this constitutes one of the reasons why 
alternative capitalist spirit models have been proposed in the literature, following for example Zou (1994) and 
Corneo and Jeanne (2001). Before presenting necessary and sufficient conditions for a golden rule steady-state, it 
may be preferable to present first a more general property that concerns any ‘terminal’ or constrained 
steady-state. 
PROPOSITION 2: Among all feasible controlled trajectories {𝑐𝑡
∗(𝜃, 𝑎), 𝑘𝑡
∗(𝜃, 𝑎)}  ∈ 𝑍 × ℝ++, converging to a 
particular steady-state solution { 𝑐𝑇
∗  ̅̅ ̅̅  , 𝑘𝑇
∗̅̅ ̅ } , there exists a preference-choice couple (𝜃∗, 𝑎∗) ∈ (0,1) × (0,1) 
compatible with an optimizing behavior; ie. which satisfies: 𝑉𝑡{𝑐𝑡
∗(𝜃, 𝑎), 𝑘𝑡
∗(𝜃, 𝑎)} ≤ 𝑉𝑡{𝑐𝑡
∗(𝜃∗, 𝑎∗), 𝑘𝑡
∗(𝜃∗, 𝑎∗)} , 
∀ (𝜃, 𝑎) ∈ (0,1) × (0,1)  /  (𝜃, 𝑎) ≠ (𝜃∗, 𝑎∗). 
This property resulting directly from the resolution might be viewed as a reciprocal of the first one. Indeed, a 
steady-state dynamics is an optimal controlled trajectory as soon as there is no other ways to reach the same 
dynamics with a higher total welfare. Suppose for example that the constrained terminal state corresponds to the 
solution of the Solow model: 
𝑘𝑇
∗̅̅ ̅ = (
𝑠𝑇
∗̅̅ ̅
𝑛 + 𝛿
)
1
1−𝛼
    where    𝑓𝑘𝑇∗̅̅ ̅̅
=
(𝑛 + 𝛿)𝛼
𝑠𝑇
∗̅̅ ̅
   and   𝑠𝑇
∗̅̅ ̅ ∈ (0,1) 
The determination of 𝜃 a posteriori for a given 𝑠𝑇
∗̅̅ ̅, requires to solve a quadratic equation in 𝜃, which implies 
two admissible sets (𝜃𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖), ∀ i=1,2. In some cases, restrictions imposed allow to eliminate one of the sets 
entirely, so that a unique underlying combination of parameters (𝜃𝑖
∗, 𝑎𝑖
∗) that maximizes total welfare can be 
identified; it is for example the case for relatively high or low steady-states. Under cases where both sets offer 
potential candidates however, the terminal state assumed can possibly be generated by two different optimal 
trajectories (or two different rational behaviors). In such a multiple equilibrium context, the goodness of fit to 
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real data becomes the last way to identify the right solution. 
The golden rule steady-state which maximizes consumption is reached if 𝑠𝑇
∗̅̅ ̅ = 𝛼 . For the multiplicative 
Cobb-Douglas form, the following condition must hold: 
[1 +
1−𝜃
(1−𝑎𝜃)𝑋
𝑎𝜃(𝑛 + 𝛿)]
−1
= 𝛼                              (7) 
where 𝑋 = (2 − 𝑎𝜃 − 𝜃)(𝑛 + 𝛿) − (1 − 𝑎)(𝛿 + 𝛽), and for the log-Utility case, 
1−𝑎𝜃
𝑎(1−𝜃)
[1 + 𝑎(1 − 2𝜃) − (1 − 𝑎)
𝛽+𝛿
𝑛+𝛿
] = 𝛼                         (8) 
3. Numerical Analysis of the Dynamics 
3.1 General Properties of the Dynamics 
The question that comes first is to know how total welfare changes with respect to the parameter 𝑎, which has 
been defined previously as reflecting the choice of an admissible trajectory made by the individual. The next 
interesting step is to understand how the variables behave along the optimal path (Note 4). 
Numerical simulations show that for a preference parameter 𝜃 that tends to one, the optimal value of 𝑎 
decreases and the maximum total welfare tends to stabilize for 𝑎 < 𝑎∗. In Figure 3 for example, when 𝜃 = 0.95, 
the maximum total welfare attains 𝑉∗ = 241.62 at 𝑎∗ = 0.71, and remains almost constant for 𝑎 ≤ 0.71 
(precisely, it decreases slowly until 𝑉 = 241.36 for 𝑎 = 0.01). As 𝜃 decreases, the value of 𝑎∗ increases but 
at a much lower rate; for instance 𝑎∗ = 0.76 when 𝜃 = 0.85 and 𝑎∗ = 0.78 when 𝜃 = 0.2. This Figure 
shows also that the choice of the right equilibrium co-state (or value of a) matters much more for lower values of 
𝜃. For example, the size of the welfare gain from an admissible path to the optimal one can exceed 26% for the 
case where 𝜃 = 0.2. 
 
Figure 3. Total welfare by admissible path 
 
 
Figure 4. Steady-state per capita capital by admissible path 
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different levels of total welfare. When 𝜃 remains relatively high, total welfare is lower than in the standard case 
where individuals value consumption only. As 𝜃 decreases below a certain cutoff value, total welfare tends to 
increase back until reaching higher values than in the standard model. Besides the fact that the steady-state 
saving rate for such values of 𝜃 seems unreasonable, as indicated by Figure 6, this parameter describing fixed 
preferences is conceptually not to be ‘selected’ so that total welfare or even consumption is maximized. (Note 5) 
In Figure 4, it is interesting to notice that accounting for supplementary motives for saving, does not always 
mean a higher steady-state capital per capita than in the standard model. For values of 𝜃 that are close to one 
(0.95 in our example), there are some admissible trajectories (for high values of a) which lead to lower 
steady-state capital per capita than in the standard case. This interesting remark will be developed later. 
Concerning transitions towards higher-steady-states, Figure 5 shows that (unconstrained) optimal trajectories 
exhibit a faster growth when preferences for saving for social reasons become more intense. Interestingly, 
although the speed of growth increases with such intense preferences, thrifty individuals appear less sensitive to 
variations of the interest rate compared to those who care about consumption only. For instance, Figure 6 shows 
that the magnitude of the variation of the saving rate along the optimal path increases with 𝜃. 
 
 
Figure 5. Equilibrium path of capital per capita 
 
 
Figure 6. Equilibrium path of the saving rate 
 
3.2 Dynamics in Constrained Optimization Cases 
Suppose for example that individuals are endowed of preferences for consuming and bequeathing such that 
future generations benefit from the golden rule steady-state at time T, where consumption is maximized. 
It is well known that for this steady-state to be possible under the standard altruistic case, the flow of Utility must 
be augmented to include a direct preference for wealth (or status) as for example in Zou (1994). A general 
specification widespread in this literature is: 
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∞
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where 𝑣𝑡(𝑘𝑡) represents the part of utility derived from the capital stock, with 𝑣𝑘 > 0 and 𝑣𝑘𝑘 < 0. Preserving 
same notations as in the presented paper, the resolution of the program under this assumption leads to the 
following rule: 
𝑓𝑘𝑇 = 𝛿 + 𝛽 −
𝑣𝑘
𝑢𝑐
                                    (10) 
Hence, given the ratio 𝑣𝑘 𝑢𝑐⁄  is always positive, the steady-state capital per capita in such models will always be 
greater than in the standard one. The alternative Utility function proposed in this paper generates a more general 
version of the neoclassical growth model by contrasting this result. 
For a convenient comparative analysis, suppose the flow of Utility of the capitalist spirit model of Zou (1994) is 
given by: 
𝑢𝑡(𝑐𝑡) + 𝑣𝑡(𝑘𝑡) = 𝑙𝑛(𝑐𝑡) + 𝛾𝑙𝑛(𝑘𝑡), where 𝛾 ∈ [0, ∞)                (11) 
For 𝑛 = 0, it can be shown that the steady-state capital per capita is given by: 
𝑘𝑇 = (
𝛼+𝛾
(𝛾+1)𝛿+𝛽
)
1
1−𝛼
                                  (12) 
and is increasing in γ. The value of this parameter can be easily deduced such as to meet the golden rule 
steady-state. 
 
Figure 7. Equilibrium path of capital per capita 
Note. Common parameters in each model are assigned the following values: α = 0.3, β = 0.02, n = 0, δ = 0.05,  k0 = 1. The steady-state 
saving rate associated to the golden rule is therefore 0.3. In the presented model, the optimal pair (θ,  a∗) is deduced accordingly and equals 
(0.901, 0.85) and in the model of Zou (1994), γ = 0.171. The standard Ramsey results have been included in each Figure to compare the 
dynamics; the steady-state level of the saving rate ŝT
∗  equals 0.21 in that model. 
 
 
Figure 8. Equilibrium path of the saving rate 
Note. Common parameters in each model are assigned the following values:α = 0.3, β = 0.02, n = 0, δ = 0.05,  k0 = 1. The steady-state 
saving rate associated to the golden rule is therefore 0.3. 
 
The slowest transition towards the golden rule steady-state in Figure 7 and 8, is unsurprisingly the Solow one 
where individuals do not take advantage of the high returns initially. In all other cases, an optimal decision 
implies a faster speed of growth which differs depending on the type of preferences assumed. It appears clearly 
that the model of Zou (1994) generates the faster transition. In other words, the stock of capital in the Utility 
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function, compared to the unconsumed part of income, affects more intensively the willingness to accumulate. 
An additional particularity of the proposed model shown by Figure 4, is to allow for some admissible controlled 
trajectories towards lower steady-states as well. Departing from the standard model, this Figure indicates that the 
steady-state level of capital per capita increases with the degree of preference for saving (1 − 𝜃) and with the 
choice parameter 𝑎, except for few cases where (1 − 𝜃) is relatively low. Figures 9 and 10 present an example 
of transition towards a lower steady-state. For a ‘terminal’ saving rate ?̂?𝑇
∗  of 0.15 (versus 0.21 in the standard 
model), two different optimal trajectories are possible. In both cases, the speed of growth remains logically 
greater than in the Solow model. For the case where the value of 𝜃 is higher, the corresponding value of ‘𝑎’ 
leading to the specified steady-state with the maximum welfare is also higher and very close to one. Interestingly, 
the difference between the values of 𝑎 in each case is such that the trajectory of the individual endowed of the 
higher preference for consumption 𝜃, appears faster than the one who values wealth accumulation more 
intensively. In that case, the thriftiest individual is again less sensitive to variations of capital returns. 
 
 
Figure 9. Equilibrium path of capital per capita 
Note. Common parameters in each model are assigned the following values:α = 0.3, β = 0.02, n = 0, δ = 0.05, k0 = 1. The steady-state 
saving rate in the Solow model and in the presented one equals 0.15. Two solutions (θi, ai
∗) are compatible with an optimizing behavior 
towards this steady-state, (0.999,0.99) and (0.962,0.97). The standard Ramsey results are reported for comparisons (in this model, ŝT
∗ =
0.21). 
 
 
Figure 10. Equilibrium path of the saving rate 
Note. Common parameters in each model are assigned the follow values:α = 0.3, β = 0.02, n = 0, δ = 0.05, k0 = 1. The steady-state saving 
rate in the Solow model and in the presented one equals 0.15. 
  
4. Conclusion 
Clearly, in the standard Ramey model, the capital accumulation occurs mechanically thanks to the interest rate. 
When its value is low, the incentive to save disappears. The desire to save or invest in itself is neither explicitly 
nor implicitly involved in the mind of the representative agent. Yet, several motives other than the interest rate 
are actually present in that framework. Important ones are a least the necessity to renovate the capital that 
depreciates, and the necessity to increase it in order to absorb a growing household. We may eventually cite also 
the desire to get richer as in the literature of ‘capitalist spirit’. We explain in that paper that including the saving 
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flow in the utility function is not only a way to make the individual humanely conscious and care about survival, 
but also to capture any other motives to save than the rate of return that could reasonably be involved. 
The standard Ramsey model is limited in any case. It generates a steady- state level of capital per capita bounded 
by the golden rule level, where the resulting equilibrium saving rate reaches a maximum value of ‘𝛼’ (roughly 
estimated at 30%), when the time preference rate tends to its lower bound level n. Capitalist spirit growth models 
as proposed for example by Zou (1994), offer a reasonable way to contrast this constraining and counterfactual 
property. However, the love of wealth accumulation as formalized in such models, allows to extend the set of 
possible dynamics to efficient and over-accumulation ones only, so that explanations of low GDP levels remain 
limited to the time preference rate essentially. The proposed model offers the possibility to expand the set of 
steady-states on both sides of the standard version, so that eventual poverty traps in low developed countries 
characterized by insufficient investment can also be reconciled in a same way with optimal growth theory.  
In the exogenous version of Solow (1956), the individual is a saver and the desire to save is set independently of 
the interest rate by assumption. We show in this paper that including the saving flow in the utility function allows, 
not only to extend capitalist spirit models, but also to recover the properties known from the exogenous version. 
We even show through an additive Cobb-Douglas Utility function, that the dynamics and steady-state solution 
change as soon as individuals derive utility (or comfort) from saving. This should necessarily be the case if 
individuals are conscious about the possibility to die or hurt if they omit to save (enough) in that context. We 
conclude that the standard Ramsey model, used as a central structure in macroeconomic models, is actually a 
particular and too restrictive version of the optimal growth model where the representative individual cannot be 
assimilated to a real human being. Therefore, several further works are worth conducting on existing 
macroeconomic studies using the standard Ramsey model to check the impacts of this more appropriate dynamic 
structure, and hence, the robustness of the results derived from those studies in the literature. 
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Notes 
Note 1. This idea can eventually be related to the modern literature of anticipatory feelings, like for example 
Kuznitz, Kandel, and Fos (2008). The individual is supposed conscious and can be affected in the present by 
future situations, even under a deterministic context. In our case, the thrifty individual obtains ‘comfort’, feels 
safe, or avoids anxiety when saving a part of income. 
Note 2. Recall the Hurwicz-Uzawa theorem, and let the demand functions be ξC and ξS, where pC = pS = 1 and m 
= Y. We have that ξC (pC,Y) and ξS (pS,Y) add up to Y each time and are homogenous of degree zero in prices and 
income. Let X denote the range of ξ. Then, the theorem states that there exists a Utility function U: X→R on the 
range X such that ξC (pC,Y) and ξS (pS,Y) are the unique maximizers of U over the budget set. In other words, U 
is necessarily a function of the two desired ‘activities’ for which total income is shared each time. 
Note 3. It can indeed be shown that the second derivative of the ‘𝑐?̇? = 0 locus’ with respect to kt is strictly 
positive for a < 1, and tends to zero when a tends to 1. 
Note 4. Numerical computations of saddle paths are made according to the shooting method. A solution a* is 
considered sufficiently accurate if in its neighborhood, changes in total welfare become relatively negligible. In 
this part, parameters kept constant are assigned the following values: α=0.3, β=0.02, n=0, δ=0.05, k0=1. For 
convenience, total welfare is calculated with re-scaled variables (ct and st are multiplied by 100). 
Note 5. The golden rule of capital accumulation is indeed not necessarily what individuals prefer. 
 
Appendix A  
Resolution of the dynamic program 
The social planner solves: 
   Max𝑐𝑡  𝑉{𝑐𝑡 , 𝑘𝑡} = ∫ 𝑈𝑡(𝑐𝑡 , 𝑘𝑡) 𝑒
(𝑛−𝛽)𝑡𝑑𝑡
∞
𝑡0
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                                s.t.     𝑘?̇? = 𝑓(𝑘𝑡) − 𝑐𝑡 − (𝑛 + 𝛿)𝑘𝑡  
Resolution for the multiplicative Cobb Douglas case:  
        𝐻𝑡(𝑐𝑡 , 𝑠𝑡) = 𝑐𝑡
𝜃[𝑓(𝑘𝑡 − 𝑐𝑡)]
1−𝜃𝑒(𝑛−𝛽)𝑡 +    𝜆𝑡𝑒
(𝑛−𝛽)𝑡[𝑓(𝑘𝑡) − 𝑐𝑡 − (𝑛 + 𝛿)𝑘𝑡] 
The necessary conditions: 
𝑖)     𝐻(𝑡, 𝜆0, 𝜆𝑡 , 𝑘𝑡 , 𝑐𝑡) = max𝜈𝜖(0;𝜃𝑦𝑡) 𝐻(𝑡, 𝜆0, 𝜆𝑡 , 𝑘𝑡 , 𝜈)  
𝑖𝑖)    
𝜕𝐻
𝜕𝑘
(𝑡, 𝜆0, 𝜆𝑡 , 𝑘𝑡 , 𝑐𝑡) =
𝜕[𝜆𝑡𝑒
(𝑛−𝛽)𝑡]
𝜕𝑡
  
𝑖𝑖𝑖)   
𝜕𝐻
𝜕𝜆
(𝑡, 𝜆0, 𝜆𝑡 , 𝑘𝑡 , 𝑐𝑡) =
𝑑𝑘𝑡
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑘?̇?  
𝑖𝑣)    lim𝑡→∞ 𝜆𝑡𝑒
(𝑛−𝛽)𝑡𝑘𝑡 = 0  
The first order condition implies: 𝜕𝑈𝑡 𝜕𝑐𝑡 =⁄ 𝑈𝑐𝑡 = 𝜆𝑡 . This static maximizing condition is to be substituted in the 
dynamical expressions that serve to derive the differential equation of the control. With 𝜆𝑡 ≥ 0  and 𝑈𝑡 
homothetic, we can express an explicit condition in a convenient way by letting  𝑎 ∈ (0,1) such that: 𝜆𝑡 =
(
𝑐𝑡
𝑠𝑡
)
𝜃
(
1−𝑎
𝑎
) ≥ 0   and   
𝑐𝑡
𝑠𝑡
=
𝑎𝜃
1−𝑎𝜃
  
 
 
Figure A1. Static equilibrium condition in the multiplicative 
 
As explained by Schättler and Ledzewicz (2012) p.96, the substitution of the necessary condition for a static 
maximization corresponds to a weak formulation of the Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle. Just like in the standard 
Ramsey model, it is the necessary condition that is substituted in our case (here, the equilibrium co-state and ratio). 
ii) (1 − 𝜃) (
𝑐𝑡
𝑠𝑡
)
𝜃
𝑓′ + 𝜆𝑡[𝑓
′ − 𝛿 − 𝛽] = −𝜆?̇?  
(1 − 𝜃) (
𝑐𝑡
𝑠𝑡
)
𝜃
𝑓′ + (
1 − 𝑎
𝑎
) (
𝑐𝑡
𝑠𝑡
)
𝜃
[𝑓′ − 𝛿 − 𝛽] = −𝜆?̇? 
(
𝑐𝑡
𝑠𝑡
)
𝜃
[((1 − 𝜃) +
1−𝑎
𝑎
) 𝑓′ −
1−𝑎
𝑎
(𝛿 + 𝛽)] = −𝜆?̇?  
Differentiating totally condition (i): 
𝜕𝑈𝑐
𝜕𝑐𝑡
𝑐?̇? +
𝜕𝑈𝑐
𝜕𝑘𝑡
𝑘?̇? = 𝜆?̇?  
𝜃(1 − 𝜃) (
𝑐𝑡
𝑠𝑡
)
𝜃 1
𝑐𝑡
[(−
𝑠𝑡
𝑐𝑡
−
𝑐𝑡
𝑠𝑡
− 2) 𝑐?̇? + 𝑓′ (1 +
𝑐𝑡
𝑠𝑡
) 𝑘?̇?] = 𝜆?̇?  
Constraining the static maximizing condition by substituting 𝜆𝑡 means that the associated equilibrium ratio 
𝑐𝑡
𝑠𝑡
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defined above can be constrained as well. The expression simplifies to: 
𝜃(1 − 𝜃) (
𝑐𝑡
𝑠𝑡
)
𝜃 1
𝑐𝑡
[(−
1
𝑎𝜃(1−𝑎𝜃)
) 𝑐?̇? + 𝑓′
1
1−𝑎𝜃
𝑘?̇?] = 𝜆?̇?  
Combining this expression with condition (ii) leads to: 
𝜃(1−𝜃)
𝑎𝜃(1−𝑎𝜃)
𝑐?̇?
𝑐𝑡
= 𝑓′
𝜃(1−𝜃)
1−𝑎𝜃
𝑘?̇?
1
𝑐𝑡
+ [
1−𝑎𝜃
𝑎
𝑓′ −
1−𝑎
𝑎
(𝛽 + 𝛿)]  
−
𝜃(1−𝜃)
𝑎𝜃(1−𝑎𝜃)
𝑐?̇? +
𝜃(1−𝜃)
(1−𝑎𝜃)
𝑓′𝑘?̇? = − [
1−𝑎𝜃
𝑎
𝑓′ −
1−𝑎
𝑎
(𝛽 + 𝛿)] 𝑐𝑡  
𝑓′ [
1−𝑎𝜃
𝑎
𝑐𝑡 +
𝜃(1−𝜃)
1−𝑎𝜃
𝑘?̇?] −
1−𝑎
𝑎
(𝛿 + 𝛽)𝑐𝑡 =
(1−𝜃)
𝑎(1−𝑎𝜃)
𝑐?̇?  
Introducing condition (iii): 
𝑓′ [(1 − 𝑎𝜃)𝑐𝑡 +
(1−𝜃)𝑎𝜃
1−𝑎𝜃
𝑦𝑡 −
(1−𝜃)𝑎𝜃
1−𝑎𝜃
𝑐𝑡 −
(1−𝜃)𝑎𝜃
1−𝑎𝜃
(𝑛 + 𝛿)𝑘𝑡] − (1 − 𝑎)(𝛿 + 𝛽)𝑐𝑡 =
(1−𝜃)
(1−𝑎𝜃)
𝑐?̇?  
𝑓′ [𝑐𝑡 [(1 − 𝑎𝜃) +
(1−𝜃)(1−𝑎𝜃)
1−𝑎𝜃
] −
(1−𝜃)𝑎𝜃
1−𝑎𝜃
(𝑛 + 𝛿)𝑘𝑡] − (1 − 𝑎)(𝛿 + 𝛽)𝑐𝑡 =
(1−𝜃)
(1−𝑎𝜃)
𝑐?̇?  
The resulting dynamical system is: 
𝑐?̇?(𝑐𝑡 , 𝑘𝑡) =
1−𝑎𝜃
1−𝜃
[(2 − 𝑎𝜃 − 𝜃)𝑓′ − (1 − 𝑎)(𝛿 + 𝛽)]𝑐𝑡 − 𝑎𝜃(𝑛 + 𝛿)𝑓
′𝑘𝑡  
𝑘?̇?(𝑐𝑡 , 𝑘𝑡) = 𝑓(𝑘𝑡) − 𝑐𝑡 − (𝑛 + 𝛿)𝑘𝑡  
In other words, we know an optimal trajectory should necessarily be generated by this differential system 
(derived from necessary conditions). There still remain to find which static equilibrium co-state maximizes total 
welfare (i.e., the value of 𝑎 ∈ (0,1)). One should understand that this value is endogenously set by the 
individual when choosing the preferred path. 
Resolution for the additive Cobb Douglas case: 𝑈𝑡(𝑐𝑡 , 𝑠𝑡) = 𝜃ln(𝑐𝑡) + (1 − 𝜃)ln(𝑠𝑡) 
𝜕𝑈𝑡 𝜕𝑐𝑡⁄ = 0 implies: 
𝜃
𝑐𝑡
−
1−𝜃
𝑦𝑡−𝑐𝑡
 = 𝜆𝑡  
𝜃𝑦𝑡
𝑐𝑡(𝑦𝑡−𝑐𝑡)
−
𝑐𝑡
𝑐𝑡(𝑦𝑡−𝑐𝑡)
 = 𝜆𝑡  
Defining 
𝑐𝑡
𝑠𝑡
=
𝑎𝜃
1−𝑎𝜃
 where 𝑐𝑡 = 𝑎𝜃𝑦𝑡  ∈ [0, 𝜃𝑦𝑡] , 
𝑎𝜃𝑦𝑡
𝑎𝑐𝑡(𝑦𝑡−𝑐𝑡)
−
𝑎𝜃
𝑐𝑡(1−𝑎𝜃)
 = 𝜆𝑡  
1
𝑎(1−𝑎𝜃)𝑦𝑡
−
1
(1−𝑎𝜃)𝑦𝑡
 = 𝜆𝑡  
𝜆𝑡 =
1−𝑎
𝑎(1−𝑎𝜃)𝑦𝑡
  
Differentiating totally the first order condition gives: 
[−
𝜃
𝑐𝑡
2 −
1−𝜃
(𝑦𝑡−𝑐𝑡)
2] ?̇?𝑡 +
(1−𝜃)𝑓′(𝑘𝑡)
(𝑦𝑡−𝑐𝑡)
2 ?̇?𝑡 = ?̇?𝑡  ,  
The first term in brackets can for example be expressed more conveniently:  
[−
𝜃
𝑐𝑡
2 −
1−𝜃
(𝑦𝑡−𝑐𝑡)
2] = −
𝜃(𝑎𝜃𝑦𝑡)
2
𝑐𝑡
2(𝑎𝜃𝑦𝑡)
2 −
(1−𝜃)[(1−𝑎𝜃)𝑦𝑡]
2
(𝑦𝑡−𝑐𝑡)
2[(1−𝑎𝜃)𝑦𝑡]
2 = −
𝜃
(𝑎𝜃𝑦𝑡)
2 −
(1−𝜃)
[(1−𝑎𝜃)𝑦𝑡]
2  
Following same simplifying tricks, the differentiated condition can be expressed as: 
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−𝜃(𝑎2𝜃−2𝑎𝜃+1)
(𝑎𝜃)2(1−𝑎𝜃)2𝑦𝑡
2 ?̇?𝑡 +
(1−𝜃)𝑓′
(1−𝑎𝜃)2𝑦𝑡
2 ?̇?𝑡 =
−(1−𝜃)𝑓′
(1−𝑎𝜃)𝑦𝑡
−
(1−𝑎)
𝑎(1−𝑎𝜃)𝑦𝑡
(𝑓′ − 𝛿 − 𝛽)  
−(𝑎2𝜃−2𝑎𝜃+1)
𝑎(1−𝑎𝜃)
𝑐?̇?
𝑐𝑡
+ (1 − 𝜃)𝑓′ [1 −
(𝑛+𝛿)𝑘𝑡
(1−𝑎𝜃)𝑦𝑡
] = −(1 − 𝜃)𝑓′ −
1−𝑎
𝑎
(𝑓′ − 𝛿 − 𝛽)  
−(𝑎2𝜃−2𝑎𝜃+1)
𝑎(1−𝑎𝜃)
𝑐?̇?
𝑐𝑡
= 𝑓′ [−2(1 − 𝜃) −
1−𝑎
𝑎
+
(1−𝜃)(𝑛+𝛿)𝑘𝑡
(1−𝑎𝜃)𝑦𝑡
] +
1−𝑎
𝑎
(𝛽 + 𝛿)  
The resulting system is therefore: 
𝑐?̇?
𝑐𝑡
=
1−𝑎𝜃
1+𝑎𝜃(𝑎−2)
[2𝑎(1 − 𝜃)𝑓𝑘 + (1 − 𝑎)(𝑓𝑘 − 𝛽 − 𝛿)] −
𝑎(1−𝜃)
1+𝑎𝜃(𝑎−2)
(𝑛 + 𝛿)𝛼  
𝑘?̇? = 𝑓(𝑘𝑡) − 𝑐𝑡 − (𝑛 + 𝛿)𝑘𝑡  
 
Appendix B  
The case of the Ak function 
Suppose 𝑓(𝑘𝑡) = 𝐴𝑘. In the Solow model, a steady-state requires necessarily 𝑠𝐴 = 𝑛 + 𝛿. There is no transition 
dynamics (to a given intial state 𝑘0, corresponds a steady-state level of consumption 𝑐0). For concreteness, 
suppose (𝐴, 𝛿, 𝑛, 𝑘0) = (0.07, 0.05, 0, 10). We deduce the saving proportion s = 0.714 and the steady-state 
(𝑐∗, 𝑘∗) = (0.2, 10). 
Assuming now a permanent productivity shock such that A decreases to A’ = 0.065, the new steady-state is 
(𝑐∗, 𝑘∗) = (0.15, 10) and requires a direct increase of the saving proportion to s’ = 0.769. 
In the standard Ramsey model, assuming 𝑈 = ln (𝑐𝑡), the differential system resulting from the optimization 
program is: 
𝑐?̇?
𝑐𝑡
= 𝐴 − 𝛽 − 𝛿  
𝑘?̇? = 𝑓(𝑘𝑡) − 𝑐𝑡 − (𝑛 + 𝛿)𝑘𝑡  
The steady-state requires 𝐴 = 𝛽 + 𝛿 and 𝑐𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑘𝑡) − (𝑛 + 𝛿). 𝑘𝑡 . Recalling the previous numerical values and 
assuming 𝛽 = 0.02, the initial steady-state is again (𝑐∗, 𝑘∗) = (0.2, 10). Deviating slightly from this steady state 
with a lower capital return 𝐴′ = 0.065 implies a suicidal behavior of the individual with a dynamics diverging 
towards 𝑘𝑇 = 0. Precisely, following the change in A, the individual choses to remain on a high level of 
consumption relatively to the new steady-state one, and to neglect the capital depreciation until a final state 
where both capital and consumption equal zero.  
 
 
Figure B1. Steady-state levels of capital and consumption 
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Figure B2. Divergence towards zero after a productivity shock 
 
A way to recover a reasonable behavior is to introduce the saving flow in the utility function. Recalling equation 
(9), suppose that 𝐴 = 𝛽 + 𝛿 as previously (with same numerical values). In that case, the initial steady-state 
chosen by the individual who maximizes total welfare is reached for 𝑎∗ = 0.9541. If 𝐴 decreases to 𝐴′ = 0.065, 
the new steady-state is reached for 𝑎∗ = 0.9484 and corresponds to (𝑐∗, 𝑘∗) = (0.15, 10). 
